Venezuela Is Not Starting from Zero: Why a “Blue PDVSA” Could Matter Again for Texas, U.S. Refiners, and Global Energy Markets in 2026

Venezuela Is Not Starting from Zero:  Why a “Blue PDVSA” Could Matter Again for Texas, U.S. Refiners, and Global Energy Markets in 2026

Sunday, January 11, 2026

By Rafael A. Vilagut
Financial Advisory – Venezuela, Spain & Costa Rica
Former PDVSA, Shell & National Supply
📧 rafaelvilagut@gmail.com

(Original Spanish article published at:
https://felizysaludable.blogspot.com/2026/01/el-retorno-de-la-pdvsa-azul-en-2026.html )

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Venezuela Is Not Starting from Zero

The potential rebirth of PDVSA does not begin from scratch. Any serious discussion about Venezuela’s oil future must acknowledge a technical, commercial, and ethical institutional memory forged over decades of integration with the global energy industry. More than 18,000 professionals, representing millions of cumulative man-hours of experience—many of them dismissed during the 2002–2003 crisis—still retain the know-how that once allowed PDVSA to manage one of the most diversified crude portfolios in the world, under international standards of refining, supply, and trading.

Today, those of us who still have health and productive working years are willing to return and contribute to the institutional, energy, and economic reconstruction of Venezuela, proving once again that Venezuelan society remains resilient and indomitable.

Rafael A. Vilagut, former PDVSA – Finanzas Felices Newsletter (LinkedIn)
https://www.linkedin.com/in/vilagut/

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1. A Viable PDVSA Built on Experience and Institutions

At the beginning of the 21st century, PDVSA Petróleo y Gas, S.A. stood out for building long-term commercial relationships based on mutual trust, transparency, and reciprocal benefits. Through its Refining, Supply, and Trading (RST) division, PDVSA developed one of the most flexible and sophisticated platforms in the international oil market, operating under the highest ethical, technical, and financial standards.

In that historical context—when Venezuela was producing close to 3 million barrels per day—a corporate culture was forged that today serves as a benchmark for envisioning the return of a “Blue PDVSA”: a technically driven, institutionally credible company supported by the return of Western oil firms, U.S. geopolitical backing, and the accumulated knowledge of generations of Venezuelan oil professionals.

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2. Venezuela Is Not a “Marginal Reserve”: The Reality of Its Crudes and Infrastructure

Reducing Venezuela to a marginal producer of heavy crude is a technically incomplete and misleading interpretation. The country holds over 300 billion barrels of proven reserves, of which an estimated 60–90 billion barrels correspond to medium and light crudes (API 20°–40°) that are fully marketable in international markets.

While the Orinoco Oil Belt does require upgrading and diluents, Venezuela possesses critical strategic assets, including:

• Integrated upgraders (Petrocedeño, Petromonagas).

• A pipeline network linking production areas to export terminals through the José Industrial Complex.

• Installed refining capacity exceeding 1.3 million barrels per day, including Amuay, Cardón, El Palito, and Puerto La Cruz.

• Integration with gas pipelines and marine terminals, enabling operational efficiency.

Extra-heavy crude extraction costs, typically estimated at USD 20–25 per barrel, can be significantly reduced through stable contracts, locally sourced diluents, and sustained reinvestment. The partial return of Chevron, Repsol, Shell, Vitol, and Trafigura under U.S.-approved licenses demonstrates that this pathway is not theoretical—it is already underway.

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3. PDVSA’s Historical Crude Portfolio: A Forgotten Strategic Advantage

At peak production, PDVSA marketed a broad spectrum of crude grades:

• Light crudes

• Medium crudes

• Heavy and extra-heavy crudes

This portfolio—documented in PDVSA’s historical technical archives—allowed for price optimization, blending flexibility, and destination diversification, adapting seamlessly to refineries across the Americas, Europe, and Asia. During that period, posted prices were calculated at PDVSA headquarters in La Campiña using rigorous technical, financial, and market-based criteria, reflecting a globally respected, fully integrated oil company.

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3.1 Light Crudes

 

Anaco Wax, Santa Bárbara, Lagomar, Lagocinco, Tía Juana Light (TJL), Lagomedio, Guafita Blend, Mesa 30, Furrial 28, Lagotreco

Key technical observations:

• API gravities ranging approximately from 29° to 41°, fully marketable.

• Low sulfur content in several grades, offering environmental and refining advantages.

• Manageable viscosities and favorable flow properties.

• A clear distinction between paraffinic and blended crudes, ideal for blending strategies and refinery optimization.

These characteristics decisively refute the myth that Venezuela produces only heavy crude.

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3.2 Medium Crudes

 

Leona 24, Caripito Light, Laguna Blend, Bolívar Coast Field (BCF-24), Lagotreco Medium, Maralago 22

Key technical observations:

• API gravities around 22°–24°, highly sought after for conversion and Conv/Asf schemes.

• Moderate sulfur levels (≈1.6–3.1 wt%) and controlled H₂S, compatible with conversion refineries.

• Nickel and vanadium content present but manageable through blending and processing strategies.

• Viscosities and pour points enabling efficient logistics from La Cruz, Caripito, La Salina, and Bajo Grande.

These crudes confirm that PDVSA historically operated with operational and commercial flexibility, not exclusive dependence on extra-heavy oil.

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3.3 Heavy and Extra-Heavy Crudes

 

Laguna Blend 22, BCF 21.9, BCF-17, Merey 16, Boscán, Bachaquero, Tía Juana Heavy

Key technical observations:

• API gravities between 16° and 22°, processable, not stranded, under Conv/Asf and deep conversion schemes.

• High asphaltenes, viscosity, and metals (Ni/V), explaining the need for:

  • upgrading,

  • blending with light and medium crudes,

  • complex refining units (coking, hydrocracking).

• Strategic export terminals such as La Salina, Trinidad, and Puerto La Cruz, confirming historic logistical integration.

Merey 16 stands as the Venezuelan benchmark crude: challenging, but well-known and valued internationally when supported by institutional clarity and stable contracts.

(For further information on Venezuelan crude assays, yields, competitiveness, and refining schemes, direct contact: rafaelvilagut@gmail.com | WhatsApp +506 6110 8665 / +506 7171 0417)

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4. Refining, Supply, and Trading: The Operational Core of Institutional PDVSA

The Refining, Supply, and Trading division not only operated Venezuela’s national refining system and the Isla Refinery (Curaçao), but also managed all international oil marketing activities. Its mission combined:

• Operational excellence

• Commercial flexibility

• Absolute respect for international ethical and financial standards

This structure was fundamental in positioning PDVSA as a reliable counterpart in global energy markets.

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5. Commercial Relationship Standards: Transparency and Governance

Companies and governments seeking commercial relationships with PDVSA were required to meet strict criteria across four areas:

i. General information
Corporate identity, ownership structure, parent company guarantees, contacts, business type, and international presence.

ii. Commercial description
Volumes traded, products, geographic markets, current suppliers, proposed relationship structure, infrastructure, and market experience.

iii. Financial disclosure
Audited financial statements, commercial and banking references, and traceability of funds.

iv. Requirements and destinations
Volumes, sales terms (FOB / C&F), crude specifications, and discharge ports.

This framework ensured financial discipline, risk mitigation, and institutional credibility—essential pillars for any future reconstruction.

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A Pending Debt with Human Capital

An unavoidable element of any serious reconstruction of PDVSA and Venezuela’s energy sector is the outstanding debt to its human capital. While companies and governments have rightfully pursued claims related to expropriations, breached contracts, and financial obligations, the more than 18,000 professionals dismissed in 2002–2003—and their families—have never been compensated, nor has the professional, economic, and moral damage been repaired.

No new Venezuelan oil administration can aspire to international credibility or genuine institutional reconciliation without acknowledging this reality and advancing toward mechanisms of justice, recognition, and repair—not necessarily immediate, but fair, transparent, and consistent with the rule of law.

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6. Conclusion: Rebuilding from Knowledge and Experience

The potential revival of PDVSA—and of Venezuela itself—does not start from zero. A technical, commercial, and ethical memory still exists, embodied in professionals trained through decades of global energy integration. The reinsertion of Western companies, under clear rules and with geopolitical backing, may open a historic window to rebuild the country’s most important industry.

Participating in this process is not merely a personal aspiration; it is a generational commitment to Venezuela’s institutional, productive, and financial recovery.

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Image: Venezuelans ready to rebuild the country
(Asset ID: 58cd5217-b3ae-4069-8ad1-03dafa7bd77e-md.jpeg – all rights reserved)

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Questions for Dialogue

1. What conditions would U.S. refiners—particularly along the Gulf Coast and in Texas—require to sustainably reintegrate Venezuelan crude into their long-term supply strategies?

2. Can Venezuela rebuild its oil industry without first restoring institutional trust with its former human capital, or is that reconciliation a prerequisite for any credible recovery?

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About the Author

Rafael A. Vilagut
Mechanical Engineer (USB, 1983) – Master’s in Finance (USB, 1990)
Former PDVSA, Shell & National Supply
Caracas, Venezuela – Madrid & Barcelona, Spain – San José, Costa Rica.

 

Versión en Español pincha aquí: https://felizysaludable.blogspot.com/2026/01/el-retorno-de-la-pdvsa-azul-en-2026.html